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NOTE
NEWDOW v. RIO LINDA UNION
SCHOOL DISTRICT:
RELIGIOUS COERCION IN PUBLIC
SCHOOLS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
DESPITE VOLUNTARY NATURE OF
PARTIALLY PATRIOTIC ACTIVITY
INTRODUCTION
Every morning before class, public school students in the Rio Linda
Union School District in Northern California (hereinafter “School
District”) stand, face the American flag, place their hands over their
hearts, and recite the Pledge of Allegiance (hereinafter “Pledge”). 1 This
daily practice, on its face, is voluntary. 2 However, public school
students are a captive audience, one that is highly susceptible to the
effects of coercive pressure and indoctrination. 3 Despite its ostensibly
voluntary nature, this governmental policy unconstitutionally pressures
public school students to state that this nation exists under a monotheistic
God. 4 This policy stands in stark contrast to the purpose of the
1

Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist. (Newdow V), 597 F.3d 1007, 1012 (9th Cir.

2010).
2

Id.
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593-94 (1992); Steven D. Smith, Why Is Government
Speech Problematic? The Unnecessary Problem, the Unnoticed Problem, and the Big Problem, 87
DEN. U. L. REV. 945, 950 (2010).
4
Newdow V, 597 F.3d at 1012; Steven H. Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundations of the
Religion Clauses, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 9, 65 (2004) (citing Newdow v. U.S. Cong. (Newdow I), 292
F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he ‘under God’ amendment not only endorsed religion over
nonreligion, it endorsed monotheism over polytheism.”).
3
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Establishment Clause 5 of the United States Constitution, which states
that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion.” 6
Newdow v. Rio Linda Union School District, 7 a Ninth Circuit
decision, is an alarming example of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
The court in Newdow held that the School District’s policy of requiring
daily patriotic exercises, including the recitation of the Pledge, did not
violate the Establishment Clause. 8 The decision allows public school
districts in California to continue to coerce public school students into
reciting the Pledge. This decision and the School District’s policy have
the unconstitutional effect of ostracizing nonbelievers and possibly
indoctrinating some students with the belief in a monotheistic God.
School policies that coerce students to support or participate in religion
should be struck down even if student participation is voluntary.
The court’s holding in Newdow is wrong because the court
incorrectly applied the Coercion Test. The Coercion Test, first stated in
Lee v. Weisman, is the determinative test in Establishment Clause
challenges involving government action in public schools, because the
test was specifically developed to address the problem of the captive
student audience by analyzing whether the government activity has a
coercive effect on students. 9 If the court had applied the Coercion Test
properly and examined the effect, not the purpose and primary nature, of
the law and policy in question, the court would have properly found that
the daily recitation of the Pledge violated the Establishment Clause.
This Note examines Newdow v. Rio Linda Union School District
and explains why California Education Code Section 52720 and the
School District’s policy of reciting the Pledge violate the Establishment
Clause. Part I discusses the background facts and procedural history of
the case and the three tests that were developed by the United States
Supreme Court to analyze Establishment Clause challenges. Part II
examines the Ninth Circuit’s application of the three Establishment
Clause tests to the facts of this case. Finally, Part III explains why the
Coercion Test is the determinative test in the context of government

5

State action is subject to Establishment Clause challenges because the First Amendment is
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. E.g., Newdow V, 597 F.3d at 1017, n.8 (citing Everson
v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947)).
6
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
7
Newdow V, 597 F.3d at 1007.
8
Id. at 1042.
9
Modrovich v. Allegheny Cnty., 385 F.3d 397, 400-01 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Freiler v.
Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 1999)); see Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577 (1992).
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action in public schools and why California Education Code Section
52720 and the School District’s policy fail this test.
I.

BACKGROUND

A.

FACTS AND HISTORY OF NEWDOW V. RIO LINDA UNION SCHOOL
DISTRICT

1.

Procedural History of Newdow v. Rio Linda Union School District

In 2000, Michael Newdow brought a claim against the Elk Grove
Unified School District in California, alleging that the policy requiring
recitation of the Pledge violated the Establishment Clause. 10 After the
district court dismissed his claim, a panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed,
finding Newdow had standing to challenge the policy based on his being
a father of a student in the Elk Grove Unified School District and holding
that the Elk Grove School District policy violated the Establishment
Clause (Newdow I). 11 The mother of Newdow’s child intervened to
challenge the decision and alleged that Michael Newdow lacked standing
because she had previously been awarded sole legal custody of the
child. 12 Regarding the intervention challenging Newdow’s standing, the
appellate court held that Newdow’s loss of custody did not deprive him
of standing (Newdow II). 13 The court issued an amended opinion
reaffirming the invalidation of the Elk Grove School District policy in
Newdow I, but it did not reach the question of the constitutionality of the
Pledge (Newdow III). 14
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari and
reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Newdow III, holding that
Newdow lacked standing because he was the noncustodial parent. 15
Because the Court found that Newdow lacked standing, the Court held
that the Ninth Circuit should not have reached the merits of Newdow’s
Establishment Clause claims. 16
In January 2005, following the 2004 Supreme Court decision in Elk
10

Newdow V, 597 F.3d at 1015.
Newdow v. U.S. Cong. (Newdow I), 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002).
12
Newdow v. U.S. Cong. (Newdow II), 313 F.3d 500, 502 (9th Cir. 2002).
13
Id. at 502-03.
14
Newdow v. U.S. Cong. (Newdow III), 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2003).
15
Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 17-18 (2004).
16
Id. at 17.
11
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Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, Newdow and other plaintiffs,
including Jan Roe, challenged the constitutionality of California
Education Code Section 52720 and the related policies of various school
districts within the State of California. 17 Plaintiffs argued that the
California law and the school districts’ policies violate the Establishment
Clause of the United States Constitution. 18 The Northern District of
California held that Newdow III 19 was binding on the district court and
concluded that the school’s policy requiring recitation of the Pledge
violated the Establishment Clause (Newdow IV). 20
2.

Plaintiff Jan Roe’s Constitutional Challenge of the School
District’s Policy

The school district policies challenged in Newdow IV implement
California Education Code Section 52720, which, in relevant part, states
as follows:
In every public elementary school each day during the school year at
the beginning of the first regularly scheduled class or activity period at
which the majority of the pupils of the school normally begin the
schoolday, there shall be conducted appropriate patriotic exercises.
The giving of the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag of the United States
of America shall satisfy the requirements of this section.21

Pursuant to this state law, every morning in elementary schools in the
School District, “willing students, led by their teachers, face the
American Flag, place their right hands over their hearts, and recite the
Pledge of Allegiance.” 22 Plaintiff Jan Roe, whose child attended school
in the School District, challenged the School District’s policy because
the words “under God” in the Pledge offended her belief that there is no
God. 23 Therefore, Roe contended, the policy violates the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment. 24
There was no dispute over the fact that Jan Roe’s child never recited
the Pledge, but Roe argued that the recitation of the Pledge in public
17

Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist. (Newdow V), 597 F.3d 1007, 1015 (9th Cir. 2010).
Id.
19
Newdow III, 328 F.3d at 468-69. In Newdow III, the Ninth Circuit amended its Newdow I
opinion and denied petitions for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc.
20
Newdow v. U.S. Cong. (Newdow IV), 383 F.Supp.2d 1229, 1240-41 (E.D. Cal. 2005).
21
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 52720 (Westlaw 2011).
22
Newdow V, 597 F.3d at 1012.
23
Id. at 1012-13.
24
Id.
18

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol41/iss3/5

4

Blom: Religious Coercion in Public Schools
BLOM (FORMATTED)

2011]

5/5/2011 5:08:06 PM

Religious Coercion in Public Schools

357

elementary schools interfered “with her right to direct her child’s
upbringing, and indoctrinate[d] her child with the belief that God
exists.” 25 The district court, relying on Newdow III, held that the School
District’s policy did violate the Establishment Clause. 26
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling in Newdow
IV, 27 reasoning in part that because Newdow III was reversed by the
United States Supreme Court, the district court should not have relied on
it as binding precedent (Newdow V). 28 Additionally, the court of appeals
reasoned that Congress changed the law since Newdow III, in response to
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Newdow I. 29 In Newdow V, the Ninth
Circuit held that “California Education Code § 52720 and the School
District’s Policy of having teachers lead students in the daily recitation of
the Pledge, and allowing those who do not wish to participate to refuse to
do so with impunity, do not violate the Establishment Clause.” 30
B.

THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution provides the constitutional basis for religious freedom
in America. 31 The Establishment Clause states, “Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion.” 32 The Supreme Court of
the United States has developed three distinct tests to determine whether
a governmental action has violated the Establishment Clause: 1) the
Lemon Test, 2) the Endorsement Test, and 3) the Coercion Test. 33

25

Id. at 1012-13; see Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 177 F.3d 789, 795 (9th Cir. 1999)
(en banc) (“Parents have a right to direct the religious upbringing of their children and, on that basis,
have standing to protect their right.”).
26
Newdow V, 597 F.3d at 1015-16.
27
Newdow v. U.S. Cong. (Newdow IV), 383 F.Supp.2d 1229, 1240 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (holding
that despite being reversed on procedural grounds, the decision in Newdow III that the school
districts’ policies violated the Establishment Clause was binding precedent).
28
Newdow V, 597 F.3d at 1040-41.
29
Id. at 1041; Newdow v. U.S. Cong. (Newdow I), 292 F.3d 597, 612 (9th Cir. 2002)
(holding that adding the phrase “under God” to the Pledge was unconstitutional, and the school
district’s policy requiring daily recitation of the Pledge violated the Establishment Clause).
30
Newdow V, 597 F.3d at 1042.
31
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
32
Id.
33
Newdow V, 597 F.3d at 1017.
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The Lemon Test

In Lemon v. Kurtzman, decided in 1971, the Supreme Court had to
determine, among other issues, whether Pennsylvania and Rhode Island
statutes that provided religious elementary and secondary schools with
aid for teachers’ salaries and educational materials violated the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 34 The Rhode Island
statute allowed government officials to pay nonpublic school teachers
who taught secular subjects up to 15% of the teachers’ annual salaries. 35
The statute also required the teachers to teach only secular subjects that
were taught in the public schools and to use only materials that were
used in the public schools. 36 The statute further specified that the
average per-pupil expenditure for secular education at the receiving
teacher’s school had to be less than the average in the public school
system. 37
The Pennsylvania statute provided direct reimbursement to
nonpublic schools for expenses for teachers’ salaries, textbooks and
instructional materials. 38 Reimbursement was restricted to secular
courses available in the public schools, including mathematics, foreign
languages, physical science and physical education. 39 The statute set out
further restrictions prohibiting the reimbursement for any course that
contained “any subject matter expressing religious teaching, or the
morals or forms of worship of any sect.” 40
The Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes were clear in their
intent to advance secular education within each respective state. 41 “A
State always has a legitimate concern for maintaining minimum
standards in all schools it allows to operate.” 42 In crafting the statutes,
the legislatures of both states provided precautions in recognition that the
effect of the statutes could cause constitutional concern, because the
legislatures were aware that statutes would benefit private schools with
religious affiliations. 43 In doing so, the legislatures probably intended to
34

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 606-07 (1971).
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-51-1 et seq. (repealed 1980); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 607.
36
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-51-1 et seq. (repealed 1980); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 608.
37
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-51-1 et seq. (repealed 1980); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 607.
38
24 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 5601-5609 (repealed 1977); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 609.
39
24 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 5601-5609 (repealed 1977); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 610.
40
24 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 5601-5609 (repealed 1977); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 610.
41
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-51-1 et seq. (repealed 1980); 24 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 5601-5609
(repealed 1977); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
42
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
43
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-51-1 et seq. (repealed 1980); 24 PA STAT. ANN. §§ 5601-5609
(repealed 1977); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
35
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prevent constitutional questions from arising, but in the end, the Supreme
Court found “the cumulative impact of the entire relationship arising
under the statutes in each State involves excessive entanglement between
government and religion.” 44
While the purpose and primary effect of the statutes may have been
secular in nature, the Supreme Court found that the excessive
entanglement of government with religion invalidated the two statutes. 45
In deciding to invalidate the two state statutes, the Supreme Court
combined criteria that had been developed over years of Establishment
Clause cases. 46 The culmination of these developments took form in the
three-pronged Lemon Test. 47 A governmental action will be upheld
under the Lemon Test if 1) there is a secular governmental purpose, 2)
the principal or primary effect is neutral and neither advances nor
inhibits religion, and 3) the action does not excessively entangle the
government with religion. 48
2.

The Endorsement Test

The Endorsement Test finds its origins in a concurring opinion in
Lynch v. Donnelly. 49 In this concurrence, Justice O’Connor reasoned
that if the purpose of an action is not to endorse religion and the effect of
the action does not convey a message of endorsing religion, then the
challenged action does not violate the Establishment Clause. 50 The
central question, then, in the Endorsement Test inquiry is “what viewers
may fairly understand to be the purpose of the [government action].” 51 If
a reasonable observer would fairly understand a governmental action to
be an endorsement of religion over non-religion, or of one religion over
another, then the governmental action fails the Endorsement Test. 52
44

Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613-14.
Id.
46
Id. at 612-13.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). In Lynch v.
Donnelly, the Supreme Court held that the city of Pawtucket’s display of a crèche along with other
holiday displays did not violate the Establishment Clause. In a concurring opinion, which is the
basis for the Endorsement Test, Justice O’Connor reasoned that the display was constitutional
because the purpose of the display was not to endorse religion and the effect did not convey a
message of endorsement of religion.
50
Id. at 692 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
51
Id.
52
Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 119 (2001) (quoting Capitol Square
Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779-80 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment)).
45
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The Supreme Court in County of Allegheny v. ACLU adopted
Justice O’Connor’s “sound analytical framework for evaluating
governmental use of religious symbols” from her concurrence in
Lynch. 53 The Court agreed with the notion that any endorsement of
religion is invalid. 54 Accordingly, the Endorsement Test focuses on
whether the government action in question has the effect of favoring or
preferring religion in general, or favoring a particular religious belief
over another. 55 Understanding the context in which the challenged
government action took place is extremely important for an Endorsement
Test analysis. 56 In County of Allegheny, the Court held that the display
of a crèche did violate the establishment clause, but the display of a
menorah next to a Christmas tree among other winter-holiday-themed
items did not. 57
The concept of the “reasonable observer” has morphed since its
inception. Recently, in Good News Club v. Milford Central School, a
2001 Supreme Court decision, the Court relied on another concurring
opinion of Justice O’Connor, from the case of Capitol Square Review &
Advisory Board v. Pinette:
[B]ecause our concern is with the political community writ large, the
endorsement inquiry is not about the perceptions of particular
individuals or saving isolated nonadherents from . . . discomfort . . . .
It is for this reason that the reasonable observer in the endorsement
inquiry must be deemed aware of the history and context of the
community and forum in which the religious [speech takes place]. 58

Thus, the Court in Good News Club “decline[d] to employ Establishment
Clause jurisprudence using a modified heckler’s veto” (i.e., a subjective
standard from an individual perspective) in favor of the reasonableobserver standard, “aware of the history and context of the community
and forum.” 59 Therefore, one person’s perception that a governmental
action is an endorsement of religion is not enough to invalidate that
action. 60 Instead, the objective reasonable-observer standard relies on
53

Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 595 (1989).
Id. (citing Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
55
Id. at 593-94.
56
Id. at 595.
57
Id. at 578-79.
58
Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 119 (2001) (quoting Capitol Square
Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779-80 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment)).
59
Id.
60
Id.
54
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the perspective of the hypothetical reasonable person who is aware of the
history and context of the governmental action at issue. 61
3.

The Coercion Test

In an essential Establishment Clause case regarding religious
activity and public schools, Lee v. Weisman, the Supreme Court had to
decide whether a school policy of allowing clergy members to offer
prayers at the school’s official graduation ceremony violated the First
Amendment. 62 In making its decision, the Court declined to reconsider
the entire constitutional framework established in Lemon v. Kurtzman,
because the school policy allowing prayers at an official graduation
ceremony was pervasive governmental involvement with religion.63
Instead, the Court applied the fundamental principle that the
government’s obligation to accommodate religion in some situations
never overcomes the “fundamental limitations imposed by the
Establishment Clause.” 64 The crux of the Coercion Test is that “at a
minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce
anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise.” 65
The Court explained the different mechanisms by which the First
Amendment protects speech and religion, to illustrate that the
Establishment Clause imposes greater limits on government action
regarding religion than it does on government action regarding speech. 66
The First Amendment protects speech by ensuring full expression by all,
including the government. 67 The Free Exercise Clause is similar to the
speech provisions in that all citizens have the freedom to engage in
religious activity without fear of government prohibition. 68 However,
unlike the Free Speech Clause, the Establishment Clause specifically
prohibits the government from meddling with religion. 69 Lee explains
that “in the hands of government what might begin as a tolerant
expression of religious views may end in a policy to indoctrinate and
coerce.” 70

61

Id.
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 580 (1992).
63
Id. at 587.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 591.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 591-92.
62
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A federal district court in Florida attempted to clarify the Coercion
Test announced in Lee. 71 That court defined unconstitutional coercion as
occurring when “(1) the government directs (2) a formal religious
exercise (3) in such a way as to oblige the participation of objectors.” 72
However, the Supreme Court has declined to provide lower courts with a
definition of a “formal religious exercise.” 73 Despite failing to define
“formal religious exercise,” the Supreme Court has made it clear that
“subtle coercive pressure” can be enough to interfere with an individual’s
choice to participate in religion or not, and this subtle pressure is enough
to make a governmental action unconstitutional. 74
According to the Second Circuit, the Coercion Test inquiry should
be decided based on considerations of “individual conscience and free
will.” 75 In contrast, the Fifth Circuit conflates the contextual element of
the Endorsement Test with the Coercion Test by requiring the court to
examine the context in which the challenged governmental action took
place. 76 The Fifth Circuit stated that the “ultimate question is whether
‘the religious component of any government practice or policy . . .
overwhelm[s] the nonreligious portions.’” 77 This construction, however,
is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Lee, in which the
Court stated the minimal constitutional limitation of the Establishment
Clause prevents the government from coercing anyone to participate or
support religious activity. 78 Lee said nothing about weighing religious
and nonreligious components of the activity.
Other circuits have drawn distinctions in Establishment Clause
cases involving public universities. The Sixth and Seventh Circuits have
highlighted the fundamental difference between cases involving
elementary and secondary school children and cases in which adult
college-level students are exposed to religion through state action. 79
71

Adler v. Duval Cnty. Sch. Bd., 851 F. Supp. 446, 456 (M.D. Fla. 1994), aff’d in part and
vacated in part on other grounds, 112 F.3d 1475 (11th Cir. 1997).
72
Id.
73
Doe ex rel. Doe v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 173 F.3d 274, 290 (5th Cir. 1999) (striking
down the school district’s policy for “Clergy in Schools” volunteer counseling program by focusing
on the “design, implementation, and effect” of the challenged conduct, not its “purpose or goal”).
74
DeStefano v. Emergency Hous. Grp., Inc., 247 F.3d 397, 412 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Lee,
505 U.S. at 592, 595; Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 311-13 (2000)).
75
DeStefano, 247 F.3d at 412.
76
Croft v. Perry, 624 F.3d 157, 170 (5th Cir. 2010) (upholding the recitation of the Texas
state pledge of allegiance in public schools).
77
Croft, 624 F.3d at 170 (citing Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 173 F.3d at 291).
78
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).
79
See Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232, 239 (6th Cir. 1997) (“We may safely assume
that doctors of philosophy are less susceptible to religious indoctrination than children are.”); see
also Tanford v. Brand, 104 F.3d 982, 985 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding that “there was no coercion – real
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Adult students are less susceptible to undue coercion than school
children, so the special concerns present in Lee are generally absent in
the university setting. 80 However, the Fourth Circuit created an
exception to this general rule by striking down school-sponsored supper
prayer at Virginia Military Institute (VMI) in Mellen v. Bunting. 81 In
Mellen, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that VMI school officials should be
prohibited from leading prayer, because of the inherently coercive nature
of the military school’s educational system. 82 “Because of VMI’s
coercive atmosphere, the Establishment Clause precludes school officials
from sponsoring an official prayer, even for mature adults.” 83
Significantly, the court further stated that the voluntary nature of the
supper prayer did not prevent it from being unconstitutionally coercive. 84
The court reasoned that despite being nominally voluntary, communal
dining was effectively obligatory, and the imposition of a supper prayer
“exact[ed] an unconstitutional toll on the consciences of religious
objectors.” 85
II.

NINTH CIRCUIT’S APPLICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE TESTS
TO CALIFORNIA EDUCATION CODE SECTION 52720 AND RIO LINDA
UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT’S POLICY

In making its decision in Newdow V, the Ninth Circuit correctly
applied the rules developed by the Lemon Test and the Endorsement
Test, finding that the California statute and the Rio Linda Union School
District policy pass those tests. 86 However, the court misapplied the
Coercion Test, which is the determinative test in this context, by
erroneously focusing on the purpose of the governmental activity and not
on the effect of the policy, which is to unconstitutionally coerce
elementary and secondary students to support or participate in religious
or otherwise – to participate” because the special concerns underlying Lee were not present at a
commencement ceremony at Indiana University).
80
Chaudhuri, 130 F.3d at 239; Tanford, 104 F.3d at 985.
81
Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2003).
82
Id. at 371-72.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 372.
85
Id.
86
Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist. (Newdow V), 597 F.3d 1007, 1037-38 (9th Cir.
2010). The Ninth Circuit concluded that under the Lemon Test, the School District’s policy had a
secular purpose to encourage patriotic exercises, the primary effect was to conduct patriotic
exercises and there was no excessive entanglement with religion. Under the Endorsement Test, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that a reasonable observer, aware of the history of the Pledge, would be
aware that the phrase “under God” is meant not as an endorsement of religion, but rather as a
patriotic reflection on the political philosophy of our founding fathers. Id.
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activity. 87
The Ninth Circuit held that the School District’s policy does not
violate the Coercion Test because the voluntary recitation of the Pledge
is a patriotic exercise, not a religious exercise. 88 The court relied heavily
on the distinction between patriotic mentions of God and “unquestioned
religious exercise[s],” like prayer. 89
The court supported its position by reasoning that children are
routinely coerced to do things in school, including listening to other
students recite the Pledge. 90 The court found that in this case, “the
students are being coerced to participate in a patriotic exercise, not a
The court explained that the indirectreligious exercise.” 91
psychological-coercion analysis of Lee only applies to religion or its
exercises, which carry “a particular risk of indirect coercion.” 92
According to the court, this indirect coercion does not apply to patriotic
exercises. 93 In support of this conclusion, the court cited a Fourth Circuit
case in which a parent challenged a Virginia statute that required the
recitation of the Pledge in Virginia’s public schools, for the notion that
“[e]ven assuming that the recitation of the Pledge contains a risk of
indirect coercion, the indirect coercion is not threatening to establish
religion, but patriotism.” 94 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit cited Engel v.
Vitale, a 1962 school prayer case in which the Supreme Court
distinguished reciting historical documents or singing patriotic songs
with religious overtones from prayer in public schools. 95 The Ninth
Circuit referred to this distinction as the difference between prayer and
“a ceremonial reference to God.” 96
The Ninth Circuit found it proper to limit the indirect-coercion
analysis of Lee to religious exercises. 97 In addition to this limitation, the
court stated that when there is not a requirement to recite the Pledge, the
Establishment Clause is violated “only if the government coerces
students to engage in a religious exercise.” 98 The court found that
patriotic activities, such as recitation of the Pledge, are not religious and
87

Id. at 1038-40.
Id. at 1040.
89
Id. at 1038-40.
90
Id. at 1038.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 1038-39 (citing Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992)).
93
Id. (citing Lee, 505 U.S. at 592).
94
Id. at 1040 (citing Myers v. Loudoun Cnty. Pub. Sch., 418 F.3d 395, 408 (4th Cir. 2005)).
95
Id. (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 435 n.21 (1962)).
96
Id.
97
Id. at 1039.
98
Id. at 1040.
88
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therefore not analyzed under the Coercion Test. 99 Because the court was
able to make a distinction between “patriotic mentions of God” and
religious exercises, the Ninth Circuit held that the “School District’s
Policy providing for the voluntary recitation of the Pledge does not
violate the Lee Coercion Test.” 100
III. CRITIQUE OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
ANALYSIS
A.

THE COERCION TEST IS THE DETERMINATIVE TEST IN
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CHALLENGES TO GOVERNMENTAL
ACTION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS

Despite the Ninth Circuit’s accurate analysis of this case’s facts
under the Lemon Test and the Endorsement Test, that analysis was
unnecessary and misleading. Since its inception in Lee v. Weisman, the
Coercion Test has been the applicable test in First Amendment
Establishment Clause challenges to government actions related to public
schools. 101 “[The Coercion Test] focuses primarily on government
action in public education and examines whether school-sponsored
religious activity has a coercive effect on students.” 102 For consistency
and clarity, the Coercion Test should have been the only Establishment
Clause test applied in Newdow V, because the government action
challenged was an establishment of religion in public schools. 103
Analysis involving three different tests creates confusion and only leads
to uncertainty in future Establishment Clause challenges related to public
schools. Courts should use the test specifically developed for this
situation, the Coercion Test, so everyone knows what the proper standard
is.
One main purpose of the Establishment Clause is to guarantee that
the government does not coerce free citizens to unwillingly support or
99

Id.
Id.
101
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 580 (1992); see Modrovich v. Allegheny Cnty., 385 F.3d
397, 400 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337, 343 (5th
Cir. 1999)).
102
Modrovich, 385 F.3d at 400 (citing Freiler, 185 F.3d at 343, cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1251
(2000)).
103
See generally Adler v. Duval Cnty. Sch. Bd., 851 F. Supp. 446, 450-51 n.5 (M.D. Fla.
1994), aff’d in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 112 F.3d 1475 (11th Cir. 1997). The
Supreme Court has decided Establishment Clause cases without using all three Establishment Clause
tests.
100
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participate in religion or the exercise of religion. 104 Religious coercion
of school children by the government is unacceptable because parents
have the right to decide whether to raise their children to be religious and
to believe in God. 105 The fundamental right of parents to direct the
religious upbringing of their children has significance in our society.106
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Supreme Court struck down a Wisconsin law
because it violated Amish 107 parents’ First Amendment right to religious
freedom by requiring students to remain in school until age sixteen.108
Similarly, in Grove v. Mead School District No. 354, the Ninth Circuit
determined that a parent had standing to challenge the use of a book in
the school district’s English curriculum, based on her right to “direct the
religious training of her child.” 109
The Coercion Test was developed in Lee to protect the individual’s
freedom of conscience. 110 Federal, state and local governments of the
United States have the affirmative duty to protect American citizens’
freedom to choose their religious beliefs. 111 If the government fails to
protect “that sphere of inviolable conscience and belief which is the mark
of a free people,” the United States loses its power to influence other
nations to afford equivalent fundamental rights to their citizens. 112 When
the government coerces citizens to participate in religion, the government
compromises freedom of belief and conscience, “which are the sole
assurance that religious faith is real, not imposed.” 113
The concern over freedom of conscience is certainly not limited to
the public school context, but it is “most pronounced” there. 114 The
104

Lee, 505 U.S. at 587.
See Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 177 F.3d 789, 795 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc)
(“Parents have a right to direct the religious upbringing of their children and, on that basis, have
standing to protect their right.” (citing Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1532 (9th
Cir. 1985); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 309 n.4 (1952))).
106
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1972).
107
Id. at 211 (“Formal high school education beyond the eighth grade is contrary to Amish
beliefs, not only because it places Amish children in an environment hostile to Amish beliefs with
increasing emphasis on competition in class work and sports and with pressure to conform to the
styles, manners, and ways of the peer group, but also because it takes them away from their
community, physically and emotionally, during the crucial and formative adolescent period of life.”).
108
Id.
109
Grove, 753 F.2d at 1532 (citing Yoder, 406 U.S. 205; Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)).
110
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592-93 (1992).
111
Id. at 592 (“One timeless lesson is that if citizens are subjected to state-sponsored religious
exercises, the State disavows its own duty to guard and respect that sphere of inviolable conscience
and belief which is the mark of a free people.”).
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id.
105

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol41/iss3/5

14

Blom: Religious Coercion in Public Schools
BLOM (FORMATTED)

2011]

5/5/2011 5:08:06 PM

Religious Coercion in Public Schools

367

Establishment Clause prohibits the government from putting elementary
and secondary school students in the position of choosing whether to
participate in or protest activities contrary to their religious
convictions. 115 “What to most believers may seem nothing more than a
reasonable request that the nonbeliever respect their religious practices,
in a school context may appear to the nonbeliever or dissenter to be an
attempt to employ the machinery of the State to enforce a religious
orthodoxy.” 116 When the potential for “subtle coercive pressure” occurs
in public schools, there are profound concerns with protecting
elementary and secondary school students from such coercion. 117 In the
school context, “subtle and indirect” government pressure can effectively
coerce a student to engage in activity that is contrary to the dissenting
student’s conscientious convictions, a result the Establishment Clause
was designed to prevent. 118
B.

NEWDOW’S APPLICATION IS INCORRECT, AND CALIFORNIA
EDUCATION CODE SECTION 52720 AND THE SCHOOL DISTRICT’S
POLICY ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE COERCION TEST

The Newdow court incorrectly applied the Coercion Test by
focusing on the purpose and nature of the activity rather than the effect.
The majority decision in Newdow v. Rio Linda Union School District
(Newdow V) expressly recognized the fact that elementary school
children “unaware of its history may perceive the phrase ‘under God’ in
the Pledge to refer exclusively to a monotheistic God of a particular
religion.” 119 The California statute and the School District’s policy
should be invalidated under the Coercion Test because an elementary
school student, unaware of the history, might believe the phrase “under
God” refers to the God of a particular religion. This is the type of effect
that the Coercion Test is designed to protect against and why California
Education Code Section 52720 and the School District’s policy are
unconstitutional.
School policies that impermissibly coerce students to support or
participate in religion should be struck down even if student participation
is ostensibly voluntary. In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe,
the United States Supreme Court invalidated a school policy that allowed
student-led prayers at high school football games, because the policy
115

Id. at 593.
Id. at 592.
117
Id.
118
Id. at 593.
119
Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist. (Newdow V), 597 F.3d 1007, 1038 (9th Cir. 2010).
116
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violated the Establishment Clause. 120 The Court found that “the delivery
of a pregame prayer has the improper effect of coercing those present to
participate in an act of religious worship.” 121 Similarly, the daily
recitation of the Pledge has the improper effect of coercing public school
children to declare that this nation exists “under God.” It is difficult, if
not impossible, to separate the idea that this nation exists under God with
the notion that the individuals of this nation also exist under God. 122
Forcing students to state the existence of God impermissibly coerces
students to accept religion over non-religion (and monotheism over
polytheism), which, under the First Amendment, should be done freely,
not at the risk of ostracism. 123
The voluntary nature of a school policy does not exclude the
possibility of unconstitutional coercion. In Santa Fe, the Court stated
that although the football games were voluntary school-sponsored
events, many students were effectively forced through social norms to
attend the games. 124 In Newdow, the School District’s policy allowed
voluntary student participation. 125 However, unlike in Santa Fe, students
in the Rio Linda Union School District must attend school during the
time the Pledge is recited. 126 Despite being a voluntary recitation of the
Pledge, elementary school students are unlikely to act out by electing not
to participate, 127 especially when the teacher is leading and the other
students are following, as the court in Newdow acknowledged. 128 As in
Lee v. Weisman and Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, the
voluntary nature of the school-sponsored event is not a determinative
factor when deciding whether unconstitutional religious coercion took
place. 129 The determining factor is whether the government action has
the effect of coercing anyone “to support or participate in religion or its
exercise.” 130

120

Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 312 (2000).
Id.
122
Steven H. Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion Clauses, 90 CORNELL L.
REV. 9, 69-70 (2004).
123
Id. at 62.
124
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 312.
125
Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist. (Newdow V), 597 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010).
126
Id. at 1012; CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48200 et seq. (Westlaw 2011).
127
See generally B. Bradford Brown et al., Perceptions of Peer Pressure, Peer Conformity
Dispositions, and Self-Reported Behavior Among Adolescents, 22 DEV’L PSYCHOL. 521 (1986)
Respondents in this study of 1,027 students from grades 6-12 were more willing to follow peers in
neutral, socializing behavior activities than antisocial, misconduct activities.
128
Newdow V, 597 F.3d at 1038.
129
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586, 595 (1992); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. 290.
130
Lee, 505 U.S. at 587.
121
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There are profound concerns with protecting public elementary and
secondary school students from “subtle coercive pressure” because
public school students are subjected to the voice of the government. 131
As the dissent in Newdow noted:
The Supreme Court has never lost sight of the special danger
presented by the promotion of religious views by public school
teachers: In over six decades of adjudicating Establishment Clause
challenges, the Supreme Court has never once upheld a statute or
practice that promotes religion or religious beliefs in public schools or
that coerces students to express or adopt any religious views. 132

California Education Code Section 52720 and the School District’s
policy directly infringe on the individual conscience of a group
especially susceptible to that type of “subtle coercive pressure,” namely,
elementary school students. 133
While the pressures that exist to recite the Pledge may not be
blatant, the indirect effects of peer pressure and teacher acceptance are
enough to make a non-religious public school student feel pressured to
participate in activity that is contrary to that student’s religious beliefs.
Subtle, indirect coercion can be “as real as any overt compulsion.” 134
“What to most believers may seem nothing more than a reasonable
request that the nonbeliever respect their religious practices, in a school
context may appear to the nonbeliever or dissenter to be an attempt to
employ the machinery of the State to enforce a religious orthodoxy.” 135
A policy that requires voluntary recitation of the Pledge fails the
Coercion Test because it produces an unconstitutionally coercive effect
on students to participate in the “voluntary” recitation and state that the
United States of America exists under God.
The Newdow court’s acknowledgment that children are coerced to
do things in school constantly, like learning to read and solve math
problems, 136 failed to address the core issue of whether requiring

131

Id. at 592.
Newdow V, 597 F.3d at 1095-96 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (citing Santa Fe Indep. Sch.
Dist., 530 U.S. 290; Lee, 505 U.S. 577; Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S.
97 (1968); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421 (1962)).
133
Steven D. Smith, Why Is Government Speech Problematic? The Unnecessary Problem, the
Unnoticed Problem, and the Big Problem, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 945, 950 (2010).
134
Lee, 505 U.S. at 593.
135
Id. at 592.
136
Newdow V, 597 F.3d at 1038 (majority opinion).
132
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voluntary recitation of the Pledge in public schools violates the
Establishment Clause because the recitation coerces pupils to support or
participate in religion. While the court conceded that elementary school
children are coerced to listen to the teacher and other students recite the
Pledge, the court determined that the recitation of the Pledge is a
patriotic exercise, not a religious one. 137 The court ignored the effect of
the recitation of the Pledge and neglected to recognize that “a program’s
purpose [can be] logically distinct from the program’s actual
character.” 138 While the recitation of the Pledge is certainly a patriotic
exercise whose purpose is facially patriotic in nature, 139 the actual
character of the Pledge has strong religious overtones that should not be
ignored. 140
There is a particular risk of indirect coercion through peer pressure
and teacher acceptance in Newdow specifically because the Pledge is not
an explicitly religious exercise. The court erroneously stated that the
“indirect psychological analysis” in Lee v. Weisman only applies to
“religion or to religious exercises, which carry ‘a particular risk of
indirect coercion.’” 141 The court skirted the real issue that because the
students are effectively coerced to recite the Pledge or to hear other
students recite the Pledge, led by the authority of a public school teacher,
the students are at an unconstitutionally high risk of indirect coercion to
make the statement that this nation exists under God. The high risk of
coercion stems from the fact that public school students are a captive
audience, 142 compelled by law to attend school under California’s
compulsory education law. 143
In Newdow v. Rio Linda Union School District, the coercion may be
indirect, but it is also real and apparent because elementary and
secondary school students are effectively pressured to state that this
nation exists under God. For some students, this will undoubtedly be
contrary to their and their parents’ religious beliefs or nonbeliefs and will
alienate them from their peers. For others, especially young elementary
137

Id.
Doe ex rel. Doe v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 173 F.3d 274, 290 (5th Cir. 1999) (striking
down the school district’s policy for “Clergy in Schools” volunteer counseling program by focusing
on the “design, implementation, and effect” of the challenged conduct, not its “purpose or goal”).
139
Whether or not the Pledge, as amended in 1954, is constitutional under the Establishment
Clause is beyond the scope of this Case Note.
140
Newdow V, 597 F.3d at 1095-96 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (citing H.R. Rep. 107-659, at 5)
(“[T]he Pledge ‘is a recognition of the fact that many Americans believe in God.’”).
141
Id. at 1039 (majority opinion) (citing Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586, 592 (1992).
142
Steven D. Smith, Why Is Government Speech Problematic? The Unnecessary Problem, the
Unnoticed Problem, and the Big Problem, 87 DEN. U. L. REV. 945, 950 (2010).
143
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48200 et seq. (Westlaw 2011).
138
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school students, the belief or nonbelief in God may not yet have formed.
By forcing these students to recite, or at least to hear other students
recite, the Pledge led by their teacher, the School District is engaging in
activity that violates the Establishment Clause and interferes with the
parents’ right to direct the religious upbringing of their children. 144
An additional roadblock often encountered in Coercion Test
analysis is the fact that the Supreme Court has failed to define “formal
religious exercise.” 145 Instead, lower courts are left to guess at its
meaning. At the very least, “formal religious exercise” must include
prayer and worship services, because these activities are the essence of
outward manifestations of religion. However, the phrase “formal
religious exercise” could also encompass a broad spectrum of “exercise”
including the profession of a belief in the existence of God. Because the
choice to accept or reject religion is guaranteed by the Constitution, 146 it
is best to define “formal religious exercise” broadly to include expressing
a belief in the existence of God. After all, expressing such belief is a
tenet of Islam, Christianity and Judaism, three major world religions. 147
The dissenting opinion in Newdow points out two Supreme Court
cases, decided before the Coercion Test was announced in Lee, that
struck down state practices because of coercive effects on students
despite not being religious exercises. 148 In Stone v. Graham, the
Supreme Court invalidated a Kentucky statute that required the posting
of the Ten Commandments in public school classrooms, because the
statute had the effect of “‘[inducing] the school-children to read,
meditate upon, perhaps to venerate and obey, the [Ten]
Commandments.’” 149 Sitting in a room with a copy of the Ten
Commandments is not likely to be considered a religious exercise, no
144

Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 177 F.3d 789, 795 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
Doe ex rel. Doe v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 173 F.3d 274, 290 (5th Cir. 1999).
146
Steven H. Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion Clauses, 90 CORNELL L.
REV. 9, 65 (2004).
147
Richard
Hooker,
The
Five
Pillars,
WASHINGTON
S T.
U.,
http://www.wsu.edu/~dee/GLOSSARY/5PILLARS.HTM (last updated July 14, 1999) (stating that
Shahadah is the core of Islamic faith and requires Muslims to express, “There is not God but God
and Muhammad is the messenger of God”); Charles Hedrick, What Are Major Christian Beliefs?,
SOC.RELIGION.CHRISTIAN, http://geneva.rutgers.edu/src/christianity/major.html (last visited Apr. 6,
2011) (stating that many of the basic Christian beliefs can be found in the common Christian prayer,
the Apostles’ Creed, “I believe in God, the Father Almighty, creator of Heaven and Earth”); Tracey
Rich, What do Jews Believe?, JUDAISM 101, http://www.jewfaq.org/beliefs.htm (last visited Apr. 6,
2011) (stating that Rambam’s thirteen principles of faith include the belief that God exists).
148
Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist. (Newdow V), 597 F.3d 1007, 1098-1100 (9th Cir.
2010) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (quoting Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Stone v.
Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980)).
149
Id. at 1099 (quoting Stone, 449 U.S. at 42).
145
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matter how broadly construed. 150 As an example of where “subtle
coercive pressure” can arise, the Court in Lee cited Edwards v.
Aguillard. 151 In Edwards, the Court invalidated a Louisiana statute that
required creation science to be taught in public schools. 152 Including
teaching the critiques of scientific theory from a religious viewpoint in a
definition of “religious exercise” would require a very broad definition of
that term, 153 rendering the term nearly meaningless. While these two
cases were decided before the Coercion Test was announced in Lee, they
do give weight to the reasoning that “Lee must be understood to hold, as
it explicitly states, ‘that government may not coerce anyone to support or
participate in religion or its exercise.’” 154 Using this logic, the voluntary
recitation of the Pledge, whether a religious exercise or not, led by
teachers in Rio Linda Union School District should be invalidated as
unconstitutional coercion to support or participate in religion.
CONCLUSION
Public school students are a captive audience whose minds the
government has broad power to shape and influence in a number of
ways. Even though the recitation of the Pledge is voluntary, public
school students should not be coerced to support or participate in the
religious activity of acknowledging the existence of God, which is an
integral part of reciting the Pledge. Religious freedom requires
governmental neutrality to ensure citizens the right to practice religion as
well as the right not to practice religion. 155 The Establishment Clause is
meant to ensure these rights. 156 A policy that effectively forces
elementary school children to state a belief in a monotheistic God is in
direct conflict with this principle of American democracy.
Despite strenuous efforts by proponents of reciting the Pledge in
public schools, there is not one compelling argument that the phrase
“under God” is not religious in nature. While there is historical
significance in the phrase “under God” regarding the history of the
formation of our country, there can be no doubt that the word God
denotes religion. Not only is the phrase “under God” religious in nature,
150

Id.
Id. at 1099 n.86 (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992)).
152
Id. at 1098-99 (citing Edwards, 482 U.S. 578).
153
Id. at 1099.
154
Id. at 1090 (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 587).
155
McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)).
156
Id. at 860 (quoting Epperson, 393 U.S. at 104).
151
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it is monotheistic in nature. 157 The monotheistic nature of the phrase
“under God” 158 compounds the Establishment Clause violation. The
phrase favors not only religion over non-religion, but monotheistic
religion over polytheistic religion. 159
Under the Establishment Clause, and particularly under the
Coercion Test, public school students should not be forced to support or
participate in this religious activity. Undoubtedly, supporters of the
California law and the School District’s policy will continue to point to
the patriotic purpose and the voluntary nature of the policy. These
arguments, however, are not enough to protect religious freedom in the
way the Constitution mandates. The Constitution requires that the
government not establish or favor religion over non-religion, or one
religion over another. California Education Code Section 52720 and the
School District’s policy do both, thus violating the Establishment Clause.
DANIEL D. BLOM *

157

Steven H. Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion Clauses, 90 CORNELL L.
REV. 9, 65 (2004) (citing Newdow v. U.S. Cong. (Newdow I), 292 F.3d 597, 607-08 (9th Cir. 2002)
(“[T]he ‘under God’ amendment not only endorsed religion over nonreligion, it endorsed
monotheism over polytheism.”).
158
Id.
159
Id.
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